Thailand proposes closer control of broker introducers and their incentives

Thailand’s SEC announced a draft framework for introducing broker agents on 7 October, following publication of the consultation paper a day earlier. Securities and derivatives operators would have to connect client acquisition to formal selection, contracting and continuing supervision. Responses are due by 5 November.[1][2]

The proposed definition includes people who introduce or solicit customers whether or not they receive payment, while excluding the operator’s investment consultants. Brokers would conduct credibility checks, sign written agreements and ensure disclosure of the introducer’s role and whether the broker pays them.[1]

The payment formula is only the beginning

The explanatory paper expressly contemplates initial payments linked to successful account openings and continuing payments linked to trading volume or assets under management. It also includes finfluencers when they perform the introducer function. The proposal is therefore more specific than a general ban on transaction-related referral fees.[2]

Under the draft, direct and indirect remuneration must have appropriate rates, methods and payment periods. It must not push customer charges unduly high or create incentives for unnecessary transactions or activity contrary to customers’ interests.[3]

Consider an entirely hypothetical contract paying THB200 for each completed account plus THB10 for each later trade. Ten accounts generate THB2,000; 500 subsequent trades generate another THB5,000. The invented rates show why a campaign review that counts only new accounts can miss the larger ongoing incentive. Small payments per transaction can still create a strong reason to encourage repeated activity.

A practical assessment would connect remuneration to customer behaviour: whether the introducer’s messages encourage a suitable use of the service, whether complaints cluster around a channel and whether repeat trading adds costs without a clear customer purpose. Those are analytical implications of the proposed conduct standard, not prescribed numerical thresholds or a regulator-approved commission formula.[3]

What an introducer could do

The paper explains that investment advice and taking orders already fall within licensed securities or derivatives business. It proposes no additional licensing system for the new framework. This leaves a useful distinction between introducing a customer and exercising a separately regulated function.[2]

For a broker, the operational question is where the referral relationship hands over to its own controlled process. An agreement can identify who provides a product explanation, who receives an instruction and where application data enters the broker’s system. This also gives an acquisition team something concrete to review when an affiliate offers to perform more work than originally agreed.

Supervision continues after onboarding

Operators would monitor introducers regularly, set responses to non-compliance and report to the SEC twice yearly. SEC-approved Association of Thai Securities Companies rules would also apply.[1]

The paper anticipates commencement on publication in the Royal Gazette during the fourth quarter of 2026, while the draft itself leaves the date blank. Non-conforming existing contracts would need amendment at the first opportunity and within 180 days of commencement. That clock has not begun under this consultation.[2][3]

The business case for a referral channel should therefore include its supervision cost. A channel that generates accounts cheaply can become expensive if its messages, incentives and delegated work are difficult to control. The proposal makes that ongoing relationship the central unit of oversight, extending the assessment beyond the initial cost of acquiring a customer.

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