OANDA Europe’s first full year under a new transfer-pricing model ended in a £2.07m loss before FTMO took control

OANDA Europe Limited’s first full calendar year after the group replaced its residual-profit-split arrangement with a royalty-and-services transfer-pricing structure ended in a £2.073 million pre-tax loss. Revenue fell 19.3% to £14.900 million from £18.474 million, reversing the prior year’s £1.507 million profit. The transfer-pricing change took effect in April 2024, so 2025 is the first reported year in which the new framework applied throughout the entire accounting period.[1][2][3]

The timing matters, but it does not prove causation. FTMO agreed to acquire OANDA in January 2025 and completed the transaction on 1 December 2025, one month before year-end. The loss cannot reasonably be described as the financial result of FTMO ownership when almost all the period preceded completion. Nor can the transfer-pricing method alone be blamed without the 2025 revenue-note detail and expense bridge. What the records establish is a sharp entity-level reversal during a year framed by a new intercompany remuneration model and a late change of control.[4]

The 2024 base was partly transitional

OANDA Europe’s 2024 accounts disclosed £10.1 million of trading-revenue allocation from OANDA Australia and £8.3 million of business-consulting income from group entities on a cost-plus basis. During that year, the group terminated the residual profit split and moved to a royalty-and-services structure from April.[3]

That means the £18.474 million 2024 comparator contains nine months under the new method and three months before it. The £14.900 million 2025 figure reflects a full year after the change. A simple 19.3% growth rate is arithmetically correct but not a perfectly like-for-like commercial comparison. Part of the movement may arise from how group economics were allocated, not only from customer activity.[2][5][4][1][3]

The public extracts of the 2025 accounts do not provide the same line-by-line split between trading allocation, royalties and services. Without that split, the revenue decline cannot be decomposed into client activity, pricing, intercompany rates or scope changes. Any claim that UK customers traded 19.3% less would go beyond the evidence.[2][5][4][1][3]

The operating swing was larger than the revenue fall

Operating profit moved from £1.507 million to a £2.073 million loss, a negative swing of £3.580 million. The operating margin changed from 8.2% to minus 13.9%. Net loss was £1.593 million, compared with £1.072 million profit in 2024.[2]

Revenue fell £3.574 million—almost the same magnitude as the £3.580 million operating-profit swing. That numerical proximity indicates that the expense base was broadly stable in aggregate relative to the revenue movement, although it does not prove every cost was unchanged. A detailed cost bridge is needed before describing the loss as a cost-control failure.[2][5][4][1][3]

Average employees rose from 54 to 56. Wages fell 15.1% from £7.784 million to £6.609 million, while directors’ remuneration rose 7.9% to £1.700 million. The highest-paid director’s remuneration fell from £503,679 to £416,624. Those mixed movements suggest that bonus timing, role changes or pay composition mattered, but the filings do not support a definitive explanation.[2]

Company cash fell 19.7% to £6.440 million. Net assets declined only 4.6%, from £11.441 million to £10.917 million, despite the £1.593 million net loss. The difference implies an offsetting movement in equity of about £1.069 million. The indexed summary does not identify whether that was a capital contribution, reserve movement, share-based item or another adjustment. It should be presented as an unresolved bridge, not guessed.[2][5][4][1][3]

The acquisition was not the operating cause shown by the accounts

FTMO and OANDA announced that the acquisition completed on 1 December 2025 after regulatory approvals. Companies House subsequently recorded FTMO founders Marek Vašíček and Otakar Šuffner as persons with significant control from that date. Those records establish ownership timing.[4][1]

They do not establish that FTMO directed the pricing, staffing or customer strategy that produced the January-to-November result. Acquisition planning could have influenced decisions before completion, but evidence of that influence would require board minutes, transaction documents or company comment. The cautious conclusion is that the 2025 loss became the opening inherited position for the new owner, not that the new owner caused it.[2][5][4][1][3]

A later OANDA announcement transferred the OANDA Prop Trader business into the FTMO group in March 2026 and said OANDA would refocus on core brokerage. That post-period event may alter future revenue and cost allocation, but it does not belong in the 2025 income statement.[5]

Transfer pricing is not merely an accounting footnote

For a multinational broker, intercompany pricing decides which legal entity records income for technology, execution, client acquisition, risk, intellectual property and management services. The regulated company may serve customers while paying royalties or receiving service fees from affiliates. Its profitability can therefore change even if the branded customer experience looks unchanged.[2][5][4][1][3]

That does not make the result unreal. OANDA Europe remains the legal entity responsible for its own capital, conduct and obligations. A sustained loss can reduce its own resources. It does mean that readers need the remuneration formula before treating the entity’s revenue as a direct proxy for client trading.[2][5][4][1][3]

The 2024 filing also disclosed a £5 million unsecured loan to parent OANDA Global Corporation at 5.13% and £25.8 million of segregated client money. The loan was a company asset and client money was customer property; neither should be conflated with revenue. The 2025 accounts would need to show whether the loan remained outstanding and how the new ownership affected it.[3]

What the evidence proves

The records prove that OANDA Europe’s revenue fell, a profit became a loss, cash declined and net assets remained above £10.9 million. They prove that 2025 was the first full calendar year after an April 2024 transfer-pricing change and that FTMO completed the acquisition only on 1 December 2025.[1][2][3][4]

They do not prove that the transfer-pricing change caused the loss, that customer trading fell by the same percentage as revenue, or that FTMO was responsible for the annual result. They also do not provide a complete reconciliation of the smaller equity decline relative to the net loss.[2][5][4][1][3]

The strongest test of the interpretation will be the 2026 accounts. If revenue and profitability recover under the same royalty-and-services method, customer activity or cost timing may have dominated 2025. If the loss persists while group-level trading remains strong, the entity’s remuneration and cost allocation will require closer scrutiny. A detailed 2025 revenue note would materially improve the current analysis.[2][5][4][1][3]

Method: FXBrokers.ai matched company number 07110087 to its accounts and control filings, treated 2024 as a mixed-method comparator, placed the acquisition on its exact completion date, and separated company cash, equity, intercompany loans and client money.[2][5][4][1][3]

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