IG’s US division generated more than half of client-fund interest on one-fifth of trading revenue

IG’s regional income table contains a striking imbalance. In the seven months to 31 December 2025, the United States generated £35.8 million of client-fund interest—52.6% of the group total—while producing £112.3 million of trading revenue, or 19.0% of the group total. The US division was therefore not merely another trading region. Its customer-cash economics contributed a much larger share of interest than its share of trading activity.[1][2]

The finding matters because broker analysis still tends to treat interest as a minor supplement to spreads and commissions. IG’s US division shows the opposite can be true at regional level. Client-fund interest represented 24.2% of the division’s combined £148.1 million of trading revenue and client-fund interest. Across the whole group, the comparable proportion was 10.3%. The difference changes which variables determine earnings: rates, customer balances, product structure and how much yield is passed back to customers become material alongside volumes and market volatility.[1][2]

The calculation requires caution. IG changed its financial year end, so the report covers seven months rather than a conventional twelve. Regional revenue definitions and customer behaviour differ. The disclosed closing cash balances are group-wide and point-in-time; they cannot be assigned to each region or divided into the seven-month interest line to produce a valid regional yield. The records nevertheless establish a genuine concentration in the income actually reported for the period.[1][2]

A regional table with two different maps

IG reported £590.9 million of trading revenue and £68.0 million of client-fund interest for the transitional period. UK and Ireland contributed £199.4 million of trading revenue and £20.3 million of client-fund interest. Asia-Pacific and the Middle East contributed £177.1 million and £7.4 million respectively. Europe produced £77.1 million and £2.0 million. The US produced £112.3 million of trading revenue but £35.8 million of client-fund interest. Corporate activities supplied the remaining £25.0 million and £2.5 million.[1][2]

Those figures create two regional rankings. By trading revenue, the US was third, behind UK and Ireland and Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. By client-fund interest, it was first by a wide margin. Its £35.8 million exceeded the £29.7 million combined interest reported by the UK and Ireland, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, and Europe. The same group therefore has one geographic map for customer trading and another for the income generated around customer cash.[1][2]

That divergence is economically plausible. US customers may hold different average cash balances, trade products with different collateral conventions or receive different rates. The division also includes businesses and products whose customer-money arrangements differ from IG’s classic over-the-counter CFD operations. The public table does not isolate each driver. It permits the narrower and defensible conclusion that US cash generated a disproportionate share of the period’s disclosed interest income.[1][2]

Nearly £5 billion sits in three different cash locations

At 31 December 2025, IG disclosed £454.0 million of client funds on its own balance sheet, £2.862 billion held in segregated accounts and money-market funds, and £1.669 billion held at clearing brokers. Together those categories totalled £4.984 billion. The combined number describes a customer-cash ecosystem, not a single company deposit account. Each category has a different legal and operational role.[1]

The £454.0 million on-balance-sheet category represented only 9.1% of the combined total. Segregated accounts and money-market funds represented the largest share, while clearing brokers held roughly one-third. Money at a clearing broker can support positions and settlement; segregated money is held under customer-protection arrangements; on-balance-sheet funds are accounted for differently. It would be wrong to say IG freely deployed the full £4.984 billion or earned the same yield on every pound.[1]

The three-way split also explains why a closing balance cannot serve as an interest denominator. Cash can move during the period as customers deposit, withdraw, trade and post margin. Different currencies have different policy rates. Some balances may earn nothing, while some can generate interest that is partly passed to customers or offset by fees and costs. A reliable yield calculation would require average daily balances and the income attributable to each category, which IG does not publish in this regional table.[1]

Rates and pass-through can overpower balance growth

IG’s calendar-year 2025 client-fund interest was £118.8 million, down 16.1% from £141.6 million in the comparable prior period. The company attributed the decline to lower interest rates and a greater share of interest passed through to customers. That explanation is important: customer balances do not convert automatically into broker profit. The commercial terms determine how much gross yield remains with the broker after customers receive their share.[1][2]

A broker can therefore attract more assets and still earn less interest. Suppose average balances rise 20%, while the yield retained by the broker falls 30% because market rates decline or customers receive more. The resulting income falls 16%. This is an illustration, not IG’s undisclosed calculation, but it shows why asset growth and interest income can travel in opposite directions. Balance, gross yield and customer pass-through must be analysed separately.[1][2]

The regional concentration introduces another sensitivity. If more than half of period client-fund interest comes from the US, changes in US rates, customer-cash mix or competitive pricing can affect group earnings disproportionately. The exposure is not equivalent to a simple bet on the Federal Reserve. Currency, product and hedging effects intervene, and other regions contribute. But the disclosed share identifies where the period’s interest economics were most concentrated.[1][2]

Trading revenue and interest reward different behaviour

Trading revenue generally rises when customers transact, hold financed positions or generate spread and commission income. Client-fund interest requires balances to remain in places where yield can be earned under the relevant rules and commercial arrangements. A highly active account with little idle cash can be valuable for trading revenue and modest for interest. A less active account with a large cash balance can display the opposite profile.[1][2]

That difference affects acquisition strategy. Marketing designed to attract frequent leveraged traders is not the same as a proposition designed to win long-term assets and cash. Product expansion into stocks, options, futures or retirement-oriented accounts can alter the duration and location of balances. IG’s US numbers suggest that the group’s diversification is changing not just what customers trade, but which balance-sheet and custody mechanisms generate income.[1][2]

It also affects how a regional performance problem should be diagnosed. A fall in US trading revenue could be offset temporarily by strong cash balances and rates. A rate cut could reduce interest even if trading customers remain engaged. Looking only at combined revenue can conceal the offset. The disclosed split allows management, investors and competitors to ask whether earnings are being driven by customer activity, customer assets or the price paid for holding those assets.[1][2]

The transitional period changes annual comparisons

Because the reported period covers seven months, the £68.0 million interest figure should not be annualised mechanically. Customer balances and rates may be seasonal, and the chosen months include a particular sequence of policy decisions and market activity. Multiplying by twelve-sevenths would assume the same average balances, currency mix and retained spreads continue. IG’s separate calendar-year comparison—showing a 16.1% decline in client-fund interest—provides a better directional check than a simple annualisation.[1][2]

The year-end change also affects headline growth rates elsewhere in the report. A reader comparing the seven-month number with a prior twelve-month fiscal result could infer a decline that is merely a period mismatch. This investigation uses the regional shares within the same seven-month table and the company’s explicitly comparable calendar-year interest data. Those two comparisons preserve the denominator and avoid manufacturing a trend from unequal reporting windows.[1][2]

A concentration that can move without customer withdrawals

The US share of interest can fall even if US customers leave every dollar in place. A reduction in US rates, a higher customer crediting rate or a shift from cash into securities could reduce retained income. It can also rise without new deposits if other regions reprice faster. The 52.6% share is therefore a concentration of reported income, not a forecast of cash flows or a claim that half of group client money belongs to US customers.[1][2]

That distinction matters for stress testing. A useful model would shock US retained yield, customer cash migration and clearing-broker balances separately, then test whether trading revenue offsets the change. Treating all £4.984 billion as one homogeneous deposit base would miss both legal constraints and regional asymmetry. The public accounts do not provide enough data to complete that stress test, but they identify the variables that must be requested.[1]

What this does not establish

The figures do not prove that US customers receive less interest than customers elsewhere. The report does not provide a like-for-like retained spread by jurisdiction, and different products may have different customer terms. Nor do the figures establish that interest income is risk-free. Cash and collateral arrangements involve banks, money-market funds, clearing brokers, currency exposures and operational dependencies, all subject to regulation and internal risk management.[1][2]

The £4.984 billion combined cash map should not be mistaken for customer assets available to satisfy every obligation or for cash owned by IG. Segregation and clearing arrangements exist precisely because legal ownership and permitted use matter. The analysis also does not claim the closing cash total generated the period’s £68 million interest at a stated rate. That would combine a point-in-time stock with a seven-month flow and ignore timing.[1]

Why customers and regulators should care

For customers, the place where cash sits affects the governing protections, availability for trading and the way interest may be credited. Those details are found in account terms and entity-specific disclosures, not in a consolidated revenue table. A customer deciding whether to leave a large uninvested balance with a broker should examine the applicable legal entity, product and cash programme rather than infer treatment from IG Group’s aggregate results.[1]

For regulators, the growing economic importance of customer cash strengthens the case for close scrutiny of disclosures, safeguarding, liquidity and conflicts. A broker may have incentives to retain balances or redesign products around them. That does not make the model improper; it makes transparent pass-through policies and operational controls more consequential. The revenue opportunity and the customer-protection obligation arise from the same pool of assets.[1][2]

The finding

IG’s transitional accounts reveal that its US division produced £35.8 million of client-fund interest—more than every other region combined—despite generating less than one-fifth of group trading revenue. At the same time, the group’s customer cash was distributed across nearly £5.0 billion of on-balance-sheet funds, segregated accounts, money-market funds and clearing-broker balances. The income cannot be understood by applying one yield to one cash total.[1][2]

The broader conclusion is that IG now has two material economic maps: where customers trade and where their cash earns. They overlap, but they are not the same. Lower rates and greater customer pass-through already reduced annual interest income despite the scale of balances. Any assessment of the group’s future earnings that models trading volume without modelling customer cash, custody location and retained yield is leaving out one of the most concentrated mechanisms in the accounts.[1][2]

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