Acquisitions supplied 63% of IG’s active customers but 2.5% of trading revenue

IG Group's acquisitions supplied nearly two-thirds of the active customers in its first-half headline, but only about one-fortieth of net trading revenue. The group reported 843,600 unique active customers for the six months ended 30 June 2026. Its organic businesses accounted for 314,100, leaving 529,500 attributable to Freetrade and Independent Reserve. The acquired businesses therefore represented 62.8% of the reported customer count. Yet the difference between total net trading revenue of £588.8 million and organic net trading revenue of £574.2 million was only £14.6 million, or 2.5% of the total. The contrast is not an accusation that the acquired customers lack value. It shows that a customer-count transformation and a revenue transformation are different events, especially when the acquired services use different products, pricing and engagement models.[1]

The finding matters because the same release supports two superficially compatible narratives. IG can accurately say that active customers increased 66% year on year, and it can also accurately say organic active customers rose 13%. The first measure captures the enlarged perimeter after Freetrade and Independent Reserve were consolidated; the second asks how the pre-existing businesses changed. Neither is inherently superior. The problem arises only if the reported customer growth is treated as evidence that the same growth rate occurred in the underlying trading franchise or if the acquisition-driven customer count is multiplied by an organic revenue assumption. The filing provides enough detail to keep those interpretations separate.[1]

The acquisition perimeter changed the denominator

The £28 acquired-business figure is deliberately labelled illustrative. Freetrade is an investment platform whose customer economics include subscriptions, dealing and cash-related income; Independent Reserve is a crypto exchange; IG's organic perimeter includes OTC derivatives, exchange-traded derivatives, stock trading and investments, and other operations. A customer who meets the activity definition in one model is not necessarily comparable with a customer in another. The measure nevertheless reveals the scale of the denominator change. The acquisitions added a large number of counted active customers before they added a proportionate amount of half-year net trading revenue.[1]

The timing also matters. Freetrade was consolidated from 1 April 2025, so both H1 2025 and H1 2026 include it for the full six-month comparison only if the company’s organic definition removes it consistently. Independent Reserve was consolidated on 30 January 2026, meaning its H1 2026 contribution covers about five months, not a full half-year. IG explicitly excludes both acquisitions from the organic measures. That treatment is the correct basis for the 529,500-customer and £14.6 million bridges; using year-on-year reported growth without the perimeter note would mix acquisition and operating effects.[1]

Freetrade carried the customer count; the legacy franchise carried revenue

Freetrade accounted for 450,400 active customers, while Independent Reserve accounted for 79,100. Together they reconcile exactly to the 529,500 difference between reported and organic customers. Their disclosed net trading revenue contributions also reconcile: Freetrade contributed £9.8 million and Independent Reserve £4.8 million, totalling £14.6 million. That clean bridge is important. It means the disparity is not an artefact of an unexplained residual or a selection of unmatched rows; it is visible in the company's own product and divisional tables.[1]

The organic businesses remained the economic centre of the group during the period. Organic net trading revenue increased 20% from the comparable continuing-operations base. Organic active customers increased 13%. This combination suggests that the legacy franchise produced both customer and revenue growth rather than merely harvesting a shrinking base. It also means the low acquired revenue share should not be read as proof that the acquisitions diluted the entire group’s performance. The organic result was strong enough to dominate the consolidated revenue line even after the denominator expanded.[1]

There are several plausible explanations for the acquired businesses' lower revenue intensity. Freetrade's customer proposition is oriented toward investing rather than leveraged trading. Independent Reserve entered the accounts late in the period. Acquired customers may include lower-frequency investors, smaller balances or customers monetised through revenue lines not captured by a simple comparison with IG's OTC activity. Integration decisions can also change product availability and pricing. The release does not provide a common gross margin or lifetime-value measure across the businesses, so it cannot establish whether the acquisitions were economically good or bad from the customer and revenue data alone.[1][2]

Impairment language does not settle the strategic question

IG separately disclosed that Freetrade trading was below the acquisition forecast but concluded that no impairment was required. Independent Reserve did record an impairment, reflecting revised expectations for that cash-generating unit. Those accounting outcomes add context but do not turn the customer/revenue comparison into a valuation model. An impairment test uses discounted expectations, carrying values and assumptions about future cash flows. The 62.8% and 2.5% figures describe one six-month reporting window. A business can contribute little current revenue yet retain strategic option value; it can also add customers without producing the returns assumed at acquisition.[1]

The next verifiable test is therefore not whether the acquired customer count remains large. It is whether the acquired revenue, cash generation and cross-product activity begin to close the gap with the expanded denominator. IG's unchanged geographic disclosure makes that harder to observe directly after the businesses are folded into broader divisions. Future reporting that preserves acquired-versus-organic revenue and customer bridges will be especially valuable. Without it, investors may see the customer denominator continue to rise while losing the information needed to judge how much of that scale is monetised.[1][2]

Customer scale does not yet reveal acquisition payback

The customer and revenue bridge is only the first layer of acquisition economics. IG paid consideration, recognised goodwill and acquired technology, licences, staff and regulatory obligations. A payback analysis would need the purchase price, integration spending, contribution profit, tax, capital requirements and expected retention of the acquired customers. The H1 tables disclose enough to identify the mismatch in current scale, but not enough to calculate a return on invested capital. Presenting £14.6 million of half-year revenue as the entire benefit would omit strategic and future cash flows; presenting 529,500 customers as equivalent economic units would omit monetisation and cost.[1][2]

The accounting perimeter can also alter the apparent growth rate after the acquisition anniversary. Freetrade was already included in the reported H1 2025 comparator, while Independent Reserve was new to H1 2026. The 334,500 reported increase in unique active customers is therefore not simply the 529,500 acquired-business total. It includes year-on-year growth within Freetrade, new Independent Reserve customers and organic movements, with multi-product duplication removed. The acquisition-share calculation uses the current-period perimeter, not the year-on-year increase, and the distinction should remain explicit.[1]

Revenue classification matters in the same way. IG reports net trading revenue rather than gross customer deposits, notional volume or client assets. Freetrade and Independent Reserve may hold customer balances or process transaction values far larger than their revenue contribution. Those scale measures cannot be substituted for net trading revenue in the denominator. The £14.6 million bridge is useful precisely because it compares the same income measure on reported and organic bases.[1]

A later report could falsify the concern that monetisation lags scale. If acquired revenue grows much faster than acquired active customers, if cross-selling lifts organic and acquired cohorts, or if contribution profit rises despite low revenue per user, the current gap may look like an early integration phase. If customer counts remain high while revenue and cash contribution stay small, the denominator problem will become more consequential. The present records identify the question; they do not predetermine the answer.[1][2]

The records support a precise conclusion. IG became a much larger consumer platform by customer count, and acquisitions explain most of that change. They do not yet explain a comparable share of net trading revenue. That is neither a scandal nor a verdict on the acquisitions. It is the measurement boundary that should govern any claim about how quickly IG's operating economics have changed.[1]

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