FxPro UK processed $87bn, but 98% of revenue was an affiliate recharge—not a trading take rate

FxPro UK Limited reported $87 billion of client trading volume in 2025, but that number cannot be used to calculate a broker “take rate” from the company’s £1.779 million revenue. Almost all of the revenue was an intercompany recharge under a 10% cost-plus service agreement with FxPro Global Markets Limited. Only £32,894 was identified as inactive-account fee income. The company processed more volume, yet its accounting model remunerated it principally for costs and services rather than as a percentage of the notional traded.[1][2][3]

The distinction changes the meaning of every obvious ratio. Dividing £1.779 million by $87 billion mixes currencies, a service-company revenue line and a customer notional measure. It would produce a tiny percentage that looks like a trading spread but is not one. The result would say more about transfer pricing than about what clients paid.[1][3][4][2]

Revenue was almost entirely an affiliate recharge

The reported revenue fell 8.4% from £1.942 million to £1.779 million even as notional volume rose about 7% from $80 billion to $87 billion. Inactive-account fees were £32,894, equal to 1.85% of revenue. By subtraction, approximately £1.746 million, or 98.15%, came from the intercompany recharge described in the filing.[2][3]

The accounts state that the majority of revenue is derived from FxPro Global Markets Limited through a 10% cost-plus service agreement and that profit is therefore expected to remain relatively consistent. Under a cost-plus model, the UK company receives its eligible cost base plus an agreed margin. Revenue can fall if the cost base changes even when customers trade more, and it can rise without a proportional change in notional volume.[3]

That structure also means the UK entity’s income statement is not a complete account of the group’s UK-labelled customer economics. Customer spreads, financing, hedging results and other trading income may be booked in a different group entity, while FxPro UK records the service compensation. The public record supports that entity distinction; it does not establish the detailed allocation of each customer charge.[1][3][4][2]

Profit rose for reasons outside operating profit

Operating profit fell from £205,893 to £86,614. Profit before tax nevertheless rose from £155,139 to £234,359, and profit after tax reached £326,863. The gap between operating and pre-tax profit was £147,745, or 63.0% of pre-tax profit. Coverage of the filing attributes the improvement to higher bank interest on company cash and positive foreign-exchange movements.[2][3]

The after-tax result exceeding pre-tax profit implies a net tax credit of about £92,500. It would be incorrect to say that £326,863 was generated by the operating business. The operating result, finance and currency effects, and tax accounting each contributed differently.[1][3][4][2]

Cash rose from about £2.48 million to £3.29 million and net assets from about £3.72 million to £4.04 million. Those balances are modest beside $87 billion of notional volume because notional trading volume is not an asset held by the company. It is an aggregate measure of transaction size, often counting repeated turnover. Comparing it with balance-sheet cash as though the company financed the full notional would be a category error.[2]

Exposure is not the same as volume

The accounts reported year-end net notional commodity exposure of £10.9 million, up from £2.6 million, and foreign-exchange exposure of £9.8 million, up from £6.4 million. These figures are snapshots of net exposure, not annual customer volume. They may reflect hedges, offsets, timing and the company’s risk-management arrangements. They should not be added to the $87 billion volume or described as customer losses.[3]

The commodity increase was associated with gold activity in coverage of the filing. A higher year-end net exposure can result from a temporary position around the reporting date and does not establish the average exposure or maximum intraday risk. A proper risk assessment would require limit utilisation, stress tests, counterparty concentrations and the gross-versus-net hedge position.[1][3][4][2]

The global marketing claim is a different perimeter

FxPro’s group-level announcement described 2025 as record-breaking and cited a 340% rise in new accounts and a 459% increase in yearly trades. The announcement is explicit that it concerns the international FxPro business and product ecosystem. It does not say those growth rates occurred in FxPro UK Limited.[4]

The UK filing’s 7% volume increase can coexist with much larger group growth because the brand operates through multiple entities and jurisdictions. Using the global percentages to explain the UK company’s revenue would combine incompatible populations. Equally, using the UK company’s £1.779 million revenue to assess the whole FxPro brand would understate the group’s economic perimeter.[1][3][4][2]

This is a recurring analytical risk in online brokerage. A familiar brand name appears on the platform, but the accounts belong to a specific contract entity. The relevant company for a customer depends on residence, onboarding terms and legal documentation. Group marketing statistics usually aggregate more than one entity.[1][3][4][2]

Inactive fees were visible but economically minor

The £32,894 inactive-account fee line is noteworthy because it is one of the few customer-facing revenue components separately identified. It represented less than 2% of revenue. The filing therefore does not support a narrative that inactivity charges were a major earnings driver.[1][3][4][2]

Nor does the figure identify the number of charged accounts, the fee per account, waivers, refunds or the period of inactivity. Dividing it by an advertised fee would not reliably produce an account count because different terms may apply and fees may be capped by available balances.[1][3][4][2]

What the accounts reveal

The records establish that FxPro UK handled more notional volume while reporting lower revenue, lower operating profit and higher net profit. They establish that the apparent divergence is largely explained by the entity’s cost-plus remuneration and by non-operating and tax effects. They also show that almost all revenue was an affiliate recharge rather than a disclosed customer-volume percentage.[1][2][3]

They do not establish the group’s total revenue, the charges paid by UK clients, the profitability of the entity booking the trading result, or the commercial fairness of the transfer-pricing agreement. Cost-plus arrangements are common inside multinational groups and are not evidence of wrongdoing.[1][3][4][2]

The finding would change if the company began booking a material share of customer spreads or hedging outcomes directly, or if the intercompany agreement moved from cost-plus to a volume- or profit-linked formula. Future comparisons should therefore begin with the remuneration note, not the volume headline.[1][3][4][2]

Method: FXBrokers.ai matched company number 06925128 to the 2025 filing, retained the filing’s pound-denominated income statement and dollar-denominated volume, refused to combine them into a take rate, and calculated the inactive-fee share and operating-to-pre-tax bridge from reported figures.[1][3][4][2]

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