Customer assets at US futures intermediaries grew $73.1 billion across three segregation regimes

Customer assets reported by US-regulated futures commission merchants increased by $73.08 billion in the year to August 2026. FXBrokers.ai’s reconstruction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s firm-by-firm returns puts the combined total at $673.42 billion, up from $600.34 billion in August 2025. The increase appeared in all three customer-property regimes shown in the monthly report: domestic futures and options under Section 4d, foreign futures and options under Part 30, and cleared swaps. It is a substantial expansion in the money and collateral carried by the regulated intermediary system, but it is not a measure of broker revenue, customer profits or net new deposits.[1][2][3]

The associated amount that firms were required to segregate or secure rose by $69.79 billion, from $577.15 billion to $646.95 billion. Reported assets exceeded those requirements by $26.47 billion in August 2026, compared with $23.19 billion a year earlier. The systemwide excess therefore increased by $3.29 billion, or 14.17%. As a share of the reported asset pools, the excess was broadly stable: 3.93% in 2026 against 3.86% in 2025. Those aggregate cushions are real balance-sheet facts, but they cannot establish the condition of every individual firm or the availability of funds to a particular customer.[1][2][3]

Three pools governed by different rules

The largest category is Section 4d customer property. It covers funds associated with futures and options traded on US designated contract markets. Reported assets in that pool rose from $358.20 billion to $388.09 billion, an increase of $29.89 billion or 8.35%. The amount required to be segregated rose slightly faster, by 8.43%, from $345.10 billion to $374.21 billion. The difference between assets and the requirement increased from $13.09 billion to $13.88 billion.[1][2][3]

Part 30 covers money, securities and property associated with futures and options traded on foreign boards of trade for US customers. It was the smallest pool, but it grew fastest. Assets rose from $61.06 billion to $78.64 billion, a $17.58 billion or 28.79% increase. The required amount rose by $16.84 billion, or 29.73%, to $73.48 billion. Reported assets were $5.16 billion above the requirement in August 2026, compared with $4.42 billion a year earlier.[1][2][3]

Cleared-swaps customer assets increased from $181.09 billion to $206.69 billion, a gain of $25.60 billion or 14.14%. The required amount rose from $175.41 billion to $199.26 billion, or 13.60%. The reported excess expanded from $5.68 billion to $7.43 billion. Cleared swaps therefore supplied 35.04% of the total asset increase, despite accounting for 30.69% of the August 2026 combined pool. The comparison does not identify which swap products, clearing houses or customers generated the movement.[1][2][3]

What the monthly return measures

The CFTC report is assembled from regulatory financial filings by registered FCMs. For each regime, it publishes customer assets held in segregation or secured accounts and the amount the firm calculates it is required to segregate or secure. Assets can include cash and permitted securities. Their value can change because customers deposit or withdraw collateral, positions and margin requirements move, securities are revalued, new accounts are opened, businesses migrate between entities or new FCMs begin reporting. The return is a point-in-time stock, not a flow statement.[3][4]

That distinction prevents several tempting but incorrect conclusions. The $73.08 billion increase is not $73.08 billion of sales for brokers. It is not proof that customers collectively earned that amount. It is not the notional value of futures or swaps positions. It is not necessarily cash: permitted collateral can be included. It also is not a direct measure of trading volume, because a customer can post more collateral without executing more contracts, or execute more contracts while using collateral more efficiently.[1][2][3]

The required amount is equally specific. It reflects the customer net-creditor and margin obligations that must be backed under the applicable regime. An increase can follow higher customer balances, larger margin demands, market volatility or changes in the composition of positions. The excess of assets over the requirement is not a reserve that belongs to customers in equal proportions, and it is not the same as the FCM’s adjusted net capital. Customer-property compliance and firm capital are related prudential safeguards, but they answer different questions.[3]

The reporting population also expanded

The August 2025 CFTC return listed 63 FCMs; the August 2026 return listed 75. The twelve-entity increase matters when interpreting the systemwide totals. Some of the $73.08 billion growth can reflect customer balances appearing under newly registered, newly active or newly separated entities rather than organic expansion at the same set of firms. Webull’s transition from customer balances reported by Webull Financial to balances reported by Webull Futures is one example of why legal-entity changes can alter the rows without extinguishing the underlying customer relationship.[1][2]

A perfect same-store comparison would hold the reporting population constant, map mergers and transfers, and trace each product pool firm by firm. The published data permit that work, but it requires a separate legal-entity history for all 75 names. This investigation uses the more defensible system question: how much customer property did the regulated FCM population report at each date? The answer is $600.34 billion in August 2025 and $673.42 billion in August 2026. It does not claim that every dollar of change came from existing firms.[1][2]

The growth was not concentrated in one regime

The composition of the increase helps test whether one category alone drove the result. Section 4d supplied $29.89 billion, or 40.91%, of the $73.08 billion increase. Cleared swaps supplied $25.60 billion, or 35.04%. Part 30 supplied $17.58 billion, or 24.06%. All three contributions were material. The fastest percentage growth in Part 30 occurred from a smaller base, while the largest absolute increase remained in domestic futures and options.[1][2]

The asset mix shifted modestly. Section 4d declined from 59.67% of the combined pool to 57.63%. Part 30 increased from 10.17% to 11.68%. Cleared swaps moved from 30.16% to 30.69%. These are changes in the location of customer property within the regulatory categories, not necessarily evidence that customers preferred one product over another. Margin intensity, contract design, collateral eligibility and market conditions can change the dollars required to support a given amount of activity.[1][2][3]

Residual interest is a separate safeguard

The Section 4d table also includes each firm’s targeted residual interest. Residual interest is the FCM’s own money maintained in customer segregated accounts to help ensure that one customer’s deficit does not cause the firm to use another customer’s property. Aggregating the published targets gives $13.12 billion in August 2026, up from $12.20 billion a year earlier. The $920.88 million increase is much smaller than the growth in Section 4d customer assets, and the target is not the same as the total excess of segregated assets over the requirement.[1][2][3]

A targeted residual-interest figure is also not a promise that the same amount will remain untouched under every circumstance. It is a firm-specific target reported within the regulatory framework. The monthly table does not show intraday calls, the timing of customer margin collection or every movement in the segregated account. It should therefore be used as one indicator of the firm’s planned proprietary contribution, not as a substitute for examining segregation compliance, liquidity and capital together.[3]

A larger pool changes operational stakes

The significance of the $673.42 billion total is operational as much as financial. FCMs have to calculate obligations, value collateral, process margin calls, move funds to clearing organisations, reconcile accounts and manage withdrawals across multiple markets. A larger customer-property base increases the absolute amount dependent on those controls. It also increases the consequence of data, banking or settlement failures even when required segregation is fully met. Scale is not evidence of fragility, but it raises the value of robust reconciliation and contingency arrangements.[1][2][3]

The three regimes create different chains. Domestic futures customer property may be held with the FCM, banks or clearing organisations subject to Section 4d rules. Part 30 accounts involve foreign futures markets and permitted depositories. Cleared swaps add derivatives clearing organisations and swap-specific customer protections. A consolidated number is useful for system scale, while risk analysis must return to the legal route followed by each pool. Problems at one bank, clearing house or overseas market would not affect every dollar in the same way.[3]

What the excess does—and does not—show

The combined $26.47 billion excess means reported assets were above the aggregate required amount at the snapshot date. It does not mean all firms had the same proportional cushion. A large surplus at one FCM cannot cure a deficiency at another. Nor is the aggregate excess a compensation fund available after a failure. US futures customer-protection rules rely on segregation, capital, risk management and insolvency procedures; they do not transform the industrywide difference into insurance for individual accounts.[1][3]

The near stability of the excess-to-assets ratio is nevertheless informative. Customer assets grew 12.17%, requirements grew 12.09% and the excess grew 14.17%. At the system level, the disclosed cushion did not get diluted by the expansion. That is a limited conclusion. It says nothing about intramonth conditions, concentration in particular firms, collateral quality beyond the permitted categories, or whether the customer assets could be liquidated immediately without price effects.[1][2][3]

The questions the data cannot answer

The returns do not reveal the number of customers behind the pools, the distribution of balances, the proportion posted by hedge funds or other institutions, or the share attributable to retail accounts. They do not show gross inflows and outflows, because only month-end balances are published. They do not isolate cash from each type of security in the summary table. They also do not explain whether the increase followed higher market prices, larger positions, changed margin models, new clearing mandates or transfers between intermediaries.[1][2][3]

Those limitations are why the finding should not be framed as a verdict on risk appetite or market health. A larger segregated pool can accompany more trading, more volatility, more conservative collateralisation, business migration or some combination. The evidence supports a prudential conclusion: regulated US FCMs were responsible for $73.08 billion more reported customer property across the three regimes than one year earlier, and their reported required amounts rose almost as much.[1][2]

A new baseline for broker and market analysis

For customers and counterparties, the useful next step is firm-level. Identify the exact FCM carrying the account; determine which customer-property regime applies; compare assets with the required amount; then examine adjusted net capital, clearing relationships and the firm’s Rule 1.55 disclosure. A brand-level description is insufficient where groups operate multiple registrants. The system total gives context, but custody and clearing obligations attach to legal entities.[1][3][4]

For the industry, August 2026 establishes a new public baseline: $388.09 billion under Section 4d, $78.64 billion under Part 30 and $206.69 billion for cleared swaps. Future monthly analysis can test whether the extraordinary Part 30 growth persisted, whether the number of FCMs stabilised and whether excess assets moved with requirements. The central finding is not that customer funds became safer or riskier in one year. It is that the regulated system became materially larger across every disclosed customer-property regime—and that understanding the increase requires following the legal categories rather than treating all broker balances as one pot.[1][2][3][4]

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