Trading services, networks and liquidity models
Sections ↑Ramses is an automated market maker with several network deployments and RAM governance products. Users swap tokens or supply smart-contract liquidity. Each deployment retains its own pools: shared token connectivity does not merge their reserves or order flow.[1][2]
DefiLlama’s 20 October 2026 snapshot at 20:43:48 UTC recorded approximately US$1.862 billion of rolling 30-day volume across five Ramses adapters. Concentrated Liquidity V2 supplied US$1.852 billion of that total. This is adapter-reported spot turnover, not a count of registered people or active traders.[34]
DEX deployment and token connectivity
| Network | DEX position | RAM / r33 connectivity |
|---|---|---|
| HyperEVM | Current home deployment. | Native token side of the active OFT network. |
| Arbitrum | DEX contracts remain listed. | No active RAM/r33 OFT route in the current table. |
| Polygon and Robinhood Chain | DEX deployments. | Live satellite routes. |
| Base | No Ramses DEX deployment listed. | OFT token connectivity only. |
| Ethereum mainnet | No active route represented here. | Configured eventual hub; activation remains pending. |
Pool designs
| Design | Position and execution | Practical consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Legacy V2 | Full-range volatile pools use a constant-product curve; stable pools use a different curve for correlated assets. | An LP owns pool shares. Stable-pool design does not establish that either token maintains its peg.Source 3 |
| Concentrated V3 | An NFT represents liquidity between chosen ticks. | The position can become one-sided outside its range and cease earning active-range rewards.Source 4 |
| DLMM | Robinhood liquidity is allocated among discrete price bins, represented by fungible bin shares. | The active bin may hold both assets; other bins can hold one. Fee income increases bin reserves.Source 5 |
A V3 range order approximates a limit trade by placing single-asset liquidity beyond the current price. Conversion occurs as price crosses the selected range. If price reverses before the user removes the position, the assets can convert back. It therefore needs an explicit withdrawal or authorised position manager to preserve the completed conversion. The documented design cannot reproduce ordinary buy-stop or stop-loss instructions.[6]
Launchpad integrations can create a Ramses pool at launch, move liquidity after a bonding curve finishes, or allocate sale proceeds to liquidity. A compatible locker or fee distributor can direct collected V3 fees to nominated recipients. The launchpad controls its own distribution and lock conditions; that integration does not make every Ramses pool a locked or managed product.[19]
Swap costs, pool fees and incentive economics
Sections ↑Default V3 starting fees
| Tick spacing | Initial swap fee |
|---|---|
| 1 | 0.01% |
| 5 | 0.025% |
| 10 | 0.05% |
| 50 | 0.30% |
| 100 | 1.00% |
| 200 | 2.00% |
| Robinhood: 300 / 500 | 3.00% / 5.00% |
The technical fee reference distinguishes governance-set V3 fees from DLMM’s on-chain variable fee. A V3 pool stores the current rate; authorised changes can override its initial tier. DLMM combines a base charge with a movement-sensitive component, subject to contract caps. Its volatility input comes from bin activity, not an external market-price feed. Obtain a complete route quote: deducting a nominal fee alone cannot reproduce price impact or multihop output.[7]
Who receives the swap fee
| Pool policy | LP economics | Other recipients |
|---|---|---|
| Standard ungauged legacy pool | 95% remains in reserves, increasing LP share value. | 5% goes to the protocol.Source 3 |
| Standard fee-only V3 pool | 95% accrues to in-range positions for collection. | 5% goes to the protocol.Source 19 |
| Governance-active gauged pool | LPs normally receive eligible RAM emissions instead of swap fees. | Target policy directs swap fees to xRAM voters; actual fee and collector settings must match.Source 12 |
| Current Robinhood DLMM fee-only setup | Retained fees compound inside bin reserves. | Protocol share is configurable; bin removal realises the LP’s claim.Source 5 |
For an explicitly hypothetical 10,000 USDC input into a pool charging 0.05%, the swap fee is 5 USDC. Under a 95%/5% fee-only split, 4.75 USDC belongs to LP economics and 0.25 USDC to the protocol. This illustrates allocation, not the final bought-token amount; gas, price impact, additional route legs and token-specific effects remain outside the calculation.[7]
Emissions, fee income and vote incentives are different sources of return. RAM issuance expands supply, while conversions and some buybacks reduce usable supply in different ways. The published supply ceiling limits outstanding RAM at a point in time, not cumulative lifetime issuance. A displayed annualised emission rate is therefore different from a forecast of net dilution or an LP’s realised return.[29]
Wallet funding, networks and settlement
Sections ↑Before and during a swap
| Stage | Required action | What to distinguish |
|---|---|---|
| Fund the wallet | Hold the correct tokens on the selected supported chain and its native gas asset. | An outside fiat provider has its own eligibility, identity and charging rules.Source 8 |
| Approve and sign | Review spender approvals and the trade transaction separately. | Approval permits spending; it does not establish that a swap completed.Source 9 |
| Check execution | Inspect expected output, minimum received, route, price impact and transaction confirmation. | A slippage bound can cause a revert instead of a poorer fill.Source 9 |
The V3 token-integration reference excludes ordinary fee-on-transfer tokens from its routers. It also warns that a negative rebase can reduce an LP’s assets when the position becomes active, without a protocol recovery mechanism. A familiar ticker or successful pool creation is insufficient to establish compatibility. Contract identity, token behaviour and network matter separately.[10]
HyperEVM transactions above the small-block gas limit can require big-block mode. Ramses documents automatic switching after estimation, but the user still needs an active HyperCore account, HYPE there for the mode-setting transaction, and HYPE on HyperEVM for execution. The suggested 0.1 HYPE on HyperCore is a preparation recommendation, not a universal exchange deposit minimum. A failed mode switch requires resolving that funding or account prerequisite before retrying.[11]
The published contract directory separates token endpoints, routers, position managers, governance and access-control addresses for each deployment. This matters when moving RAM or r33: an OFT transfer is a separate cross-chain action with its own message fee and destination gas requirements. A token appearing on another network does not create a corresponding Ramses trading pool there.[25]
Asset control, withdrawals and security history
Sections ↑The audit overview describes LP ownership through pool shares or position NFTs. Ordinary removal requires the holder or an approved operator; AccessHub is not presented as a universal withdrawal key for arbitrary LP principal. Those protections coexist with smart-contract, dependency and governance risk. The inspected audit material did not establish a retail deposit-insurance policy or a contractual compensation limit.[16]
Principal exit and reward timing
| Product | Exit mechanism | Timing or value consequence |
|---|---|---|
| xRAM | Direct redemption exchanges each xRAM for 0.5 RAM. | Conversion initially creates xRAM one-for-one while burning half the deposited RAM. The redemption ratio is an economic design, not a later inactivity penalty.Source 13 |
| r33 / hyperRAM | Redeem using the current contract conversion ratio, or sell where market liquidity exists. | Minting pauses around epoch processing. Redemption remains possible but can forfeit unprocessed weekly rewards; market sale value can differ.Source 13 |
| AutoVault | Withdraw the deposited position through the vault. | Withdrawal remains available during the voting cooldown, but leaving before reward processing can forfeit that epoch’s reward. No contract withdrawal fee is documented; gas remains payable.Source 14 |
| DLMM bins | Burn owned or approved bin shares to receive the underlying assets. | Accumulated fees form part of reserves, rather than a separate fee-claim balance. The asset mix changes as prices move.Source 5 |
An illustrative conversion of 2,000 RAM creates 2,000 xRAM, burns 1,000 RAM and leaves 1,000 RAM as redemption backing. Redeeming all 2,000 xRAM directly therefore returns 1,000 RAM before transaction costs. This example contains no token-price forecast and does not value any rewards earned while participating.[13]
AccessHub divides authority among operational roles, the treasury multisig and timelock-only functions. These can change swap fees, incentive gauges, whitelist settings, emissions, vote-module parameters and certain implementations. A timelock can also invoke an exceptional execution function. The published role design should not be read as a universal delay on every economic change: fast fee-setting powers and deployment-specific wiring remain material.[17]
The anti-reverse-JIT mechanism can penalise rewards claimed too soon after a liquidity change where enabled. Adding or removing liquidity may automatically attempt a reward claim before resetting the timer, so forfeiture can occur without a separate claim-button action. The documented penalty concerns emissions, not confiscation of LP principal. Collecting ordinary swap fees alone does not reset that timer.[15]
Published security evidence
| Evidence | Scope and limitation |
|---|---|
| Consensys Diligence, 2024 V3 review | The review extended into September after complex findings. Its report records fixed, partially addressed and acknowledged issues and recommends stronger testing. It covers identified code, not every later deployment.Source 32 |
| Code4rena, report dated 3 December 2024 | The October review recorded two medium findings, including reward accounting and flash-loan protocol fees, followed by a mitigation review. Audit findings are not an assurance against future loss.Source 31 |
| QuillAudits incident analysis, 28 October 2024 | The researcher described an Arbitrum reward-distribution exploit on 24 October and losses exceeding US$90,000. This is historical technical analysis; the inspected record did not establish an independently verified restitution outcome.Source 33 |
Access, restrictions and identity boundaries
Sections ↑Access begins with a compatible wallet rather than a conventional funded broker account. That operational design does not establish unrestricted legal access. Ramses’ legal disclaimer places responsibility for applicable rules on the user; a complete country schedule, formal customer classification and interface contracting entity were not established from the inspected materials. Any separate wallet, bridge or fiat provider can impose additional conditions.[18]
Wallet keys and recovery remain the wallet holder’s responsibility. Ramses’ onboarding guidance does not provide a support-assisted recovery route for a lost seed phrase or a reversal of a finalised transfer. Retaining a wallet connection in a browser is separate from maintaining custody of the keys or ownership of an on-chain position.[8]
Support, records, automation and service interruptions
Sections ↑Official technical documentation links to Ramses’ Discord and contract repositories. Developer support is especially relevant when an integration cannot obtain a complete quote, encode a route, or interpret bin-share removal. No committed consumer telephone service, emergency telephone dealing facility or response-time agreement was established. A support conversation cannot substitute for a wallet signature or make an unconfirmed transaction final.[30]
The farming dashboard displays positions, value, range status, unclaimed rewards and estimated annual returns. Those estimates change with volume, token prices, incentive allocation and time in range. Preserve the transaction hashes, amounts, token addresses and reward claims needed to reconstruct activity; the inspected guide does not establish a tax-ready statement or a complete downloadable cost-basis ledger.[20]
A submitted on-chain position survives closing the browser. For swaps built through the V3 SDK, the signer specifies a recipient, slippage tolerance and deadline; an excessive deadline can leave an instruction pending much longer than intended. Changing a webpage setting after submission does not change the already signed transaction. Check its chain state before replacing it.[24]
The REST reference publishes chain-specific data endpoints and GraphQL conversion, with a limit of 30 requests per 30 seconds per client IP. Its shared gateway also lists infrastructure for other networks, which is not evidence that Ramses operates a DEX on each one. The V3 SDK separately supplies TypeScript/JavaScript tools for interacting with deployed contracts; code can construct transactions, but execution still depends on the signing authority granted by the user.[22][23]
AutoVault delegates weekly voting to an operator and lets a depositor choose an enabled ERC-20 reward output. Fees and incentives are converted and credited for manual claim rather than automatically reinvested into the deposited position. Deposits and output changes pause during the vote cooldown. This is defined contract and operator automation; no general discretionary AI trading mandate was established.[14]
Permissions, governance and legal status
Sections ↑No current entity-specific financial authorisation was established for the interface from the inspected legal material. A protocol contract, source-code licence or audit does not supply such a permission. This profile therefore records no positive regulator entry; the unresolved point is the contracting and authorisation position, not a finding that every use is prohibited.[18]
The contract licence identifies Social Unicorn Foundation LLC as the commercial licensing contact. It describes kBUSL 1.1 as source-available, with production deployment requiring approval under its terms. That identifies a software-licensing role; it does not, by itself, identify the entity contracting with every swap user or establish supervision of client assets.[26]
Brand scope, current changes and product continuity
Sections ↑Ramses X is the multichain architecture of this Ramses profile, not a separately counted exchange. Each deployment can have its own fee policy, incentive activation and governance state, so an older Arbitrum-era product description is insufficient for a current satellite pool.[2]
HyperRAM and r33 name the same liquid-staked xRAM product; HyperRAM is the name used on HyperEVM.[12]
On 14 October 2026, the Robinhood fee recipient changed from the Sarcophagus to the Buyback Module. The new module lets an authorised fee-setter execute constrained aggregate routes and retire received RAM to the dead address; administrators control approved routes and rescue functionality. An accumulated balance is not a completed buyback, and the documentation supplies no fixed execution schedule.[27]
Earlier Sarcophagus transactions retired r33 claims and permanently locked the associated backing. They remain historical activity. The replacement of its fee-recipient role does not demonstrate that every legacy contract function has been disabled. Robinhood transfers to the dead address also do not reduce the ERC-20 totalSupply field, so they must not be counted again as HyperEVM supply-reducing burns.[28]
- Operator
- Ramses protocol; interface contracting entity not established
- Exchange model
- Decentralised
- Service scope
- AMM swaps, liquidity provision and RAM governance products.
- Client types
- Not established
- Pricing publication
- Public pricing
- Other names
- Ramses Exchange; Ramses X
- Pricing scope
- Pool-specific fees, gas and configured reward splits.
- Funding scope
- Supported on-chain tokens and native network gas.
- Custody and asset handling
- Wallet keys remain with users; deposited assets follow pool, staking and governance contracts.
- Client eligibility
- Wallet access; complete territorial and contracting terms not established.
- Support
- Official documentation, Discord and developer repositories.
- Authorisation and registration scope
- No entity-specific financial permission established.
Exchange metadata checked 20 Oct 2026Source 1Source 2Source 18Source 26
Voting, records and operational details
Sections ↑Manual voting uses weekly epochs beginning Thursday at 00:00 UTC. Eligible xRAM voters allocate their voting weight among active gauges, influencing the next emission period, then claim eligible fees and incentives after rollover. A vote does not by itself establish an immediately withdrawable cash bonus, and claims are not automatically paid simply because the wallet remains connected.[21]
RAM distributions include community, incentive, treasury and protocol-owned-liquidity allocations. The live supply presentation distinguishes issued tokens, supply-reducing burns and retired claims. Its projection assumes current emission settings and an optional historical burn pace; authorised future changes and future trading demand are not predictable from that display.[29]
For transaction reconciliation, retain the network and token contract together with the hash, position identifier and relevant epoch. The same name can refer to different contract addresses across chains. The published deployment directory also separates team multisigs, timelocks and access hubs, allowing a reader to identify the applicable administrative structure without assuming that one address or configuration applies everywhere.[25]
Sources & further reading
- Ramses documentation overview Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Ramses X networks and deployment policies Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Legacy liquidity mechanics Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Concentrated liquidity Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- DLMM liquidity bins Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Range orders Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Protocol fee reference Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Wallet onboarding Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Swapping guide Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- V3 token integration issues Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- HyperEVM big blocks Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- HyperRAM and r33 Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- xRAM conversion and redemption Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- AutoVaults Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- MEV and anti-reverse-JIT protection Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Ramses audit and control overview Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- AccessHub authority Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Disclaimers and legal scope Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Launchpad integration Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Farming and position monitoring Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Voting and reward claims Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Ramses REST API Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- V3 SDK overview Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Executing a V3 trade Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Published deployment contracts Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Kingdom Business Source License Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Robinhood Buyback Module Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Sarcophagus legacy mechanism Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- RAM tokenomics and emissions Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- DLMM integration guide Ramses · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Code4rena Ramses findings and mitigation review Code4rena · 3 Dec 2024 · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- Consensys Diligence Ramses V3 report Consensys Diligence · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- QuillAudits analysis of the October 2024 reward exploit QuillAudits / Coinmonks · 28 Oct 2024 · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
- DefiLlama rolling exchange activity snapshot DefiLlama · Accessed 20 Oct 2026
This profile reports dated public information, including exchange-published services and terms. It does not independently test or guarantee trading, custody, pricing or withdrawals. Inclusion is not an endorsement. Permissions and protections apply only to the named legal entity, service and client category; check the current official records and your contract.
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